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1. Introduction 
The southern pine beetle, Dendroctonus frontalis, is a major threat to pine forest health in the 
South, and is expected to play an increasingly important role in the future of the South’s 
pine forests (Ward and Mistretta 2002). Once a forest stand is infected with southern pine 
beetle (SPB), elimination and isolation of the infested and immediately surrounding trees is 
required to control the outbreak. If insect-infested trees are not swiftly removed, infestations 
can spread to healthy forests. The most effective approach to managing SPB is through 
preventive measures that maintain forests in vigorous, healthy conditions, including 
thinning and prescribed burning. At a landscape level, preventive measures reduce the 
overall incidence of SPB and thereby the spillover of SPB to adjacent landholdings. Yet 
many forest landowners do not undertake the management actions that can limit SPB 
outbreaks. The tragedy of the commons in forest health takes place when individual private 
owners do not acknowledge their communal responsibilities thus risking catastrophic losses 
due to poor management and/or absentee tenure. 
The South’s forests are largely in private ownership (89% of the South’s timberland, with 
nonindustrial private forest (NIPF) land ownerships representing about 95% of the private 
forest landowners and 63% of the private forest land region (Birch 1996, Wicker 2002). 
Population growth and suburban and exurban expansion in the South have divided many 
forest landholdings into increasingly smaller-sized parcels. Surveys of forest landowners in 
the South find that 90% of the NIPF owners hold less than 100 acres, and that owners are 
diverse in occupation, income, residence, forest land ownership objectives, use of 
professional forest management assistance, and forest management strategies (Birch 1996, 
1997; Bliss and Martin 1989).  
The diversity of ownership objectives and management styles on NIPF lands results in 
widely different awareness and responses to forest pest problems (Ward and Mistretta 
2002). Pine beetle outbreaks are cyclic, sporadic, and potentially highly devastating (Meeker 
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et al. 1995). Extensive outbreaks not only inflict setbacks on individual owners who suffer 
losses from forced sale of high-value saw timber for low-value pulp, but also collective 
damages on all forest owners. 
The maintenance of healthy pine forests and the various benefits associated with them in the 
South depends on effective management and control of the Southern Pine Beetle. To a 
significant extent, SPB management is a social problem because the most practical way to 
control SPB requires collective action by individual landowners across the pine forest 
landscapes in the South. Most social research on programs for forest landowners in the U.S. 
has tended to view them as individuals, and be oriented toward transferring new 
knowledge, technical assistance, financial assistance and even cultural content to 
autonomous forest landowners (Best and Wayburn 2001; Schelhas et al. 2004). Accordingly, 
we have oriented much of our analysis on forest landowners and SPB to understanding why 
individual landowners do or do not engage in practices known to be effective in the 
prevention of SPB (Molnar et al. 2003).  
However, we also recognize that, from a social science viewpoint, the characteristics of the 
SPB issue–the need for action at the landscape level, when landscapes are in multiple 
ownerships--is a problem of the commons (Ostrom 1990). Natural resource management in 
the commons has been subject to a great deal of study over the past few decades, although 
little or none of this research has addressed questions of forest health. However we believe 
that the general principles of the management of common-pool resources can provide some 
important insights for SPB management. In this paper we explore the usefulness of 
examining the management of SPB from the perspective of common-pool resource 
management. As Hardin (1968) notes, an implicit and almost universal assumption of 
discussions of resource management problems is that a technical solution must exist and the 
task is to find it. A technical solution may be defined as one that requires a change only in 
the techniques of the material sciences, demanding little or nothing in the way of change in 
human values or ideas of morality. 
2. A brief review of theory of common-pool resources and forests 
Three types of resources can be identified based on different combinations of two 
characteristics: (1) subtractability or rivalness, or the degree to which use by one person 
diminishes the potential for use by another, and (2) excludabilty, the cost of excluding 
potential beneficiaries from the resource (McKean 2003). Private resources are subtractable 
in consumption and others can be excluded relatively easily. Public resources are available 
to all (exclusion is not possible or is extremely costly) but not subtractable. Examples include 
public radio stations, scientific knowledge, and world peace. Individuals may enjoy the 
benefits of these without contributing to their production (free ride), but if everyone does 
this a less than ideal amount of the good will be provided (Dietz 2001, Ostrom and Walker 
1997). Common-pool resources are subtractable but exclusion is difficult (Dolsak and 
Ostrom 2003). 
Although it has been common in the past to discuss common property resources, recent 
work has emphasized the importance of distinguishing types of resources (based on their 
inherent attributes, from types of ownership (Dietz et al. 2001). Property may be held in four 
ways: (1) private, in which individuals or corporations have the rights to exclude others from 
using a resource and to regulate a resource; (2) public or state, in which the government has 
rights to a resource, and makes decisions about access as well as the nature and level of 
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exploitation; (3) common property, in which the resource is held by an identifiable group of 
interdependent users with the rights to exclude others, and (4) open access, in which there are 
no well-defined property rights, the resource is unregulated, and it is free and open to 
everyone (Feeny et al. 1990). Research on the commons suggests that the fit between 
property type and resource type has an important bearing on effective resource 
management (Dietz et al. 2001, Stern et al. 2002).  
Geores (2003) points out that forests are complex, large scale resources that can be defined 
and assigned property rights in various ways: (1) Forest are appreciated as renewable 
natural resources, valued for the use of their products and for their roles in maintaining 
watersheds, soil fertility, and air quality, as well as for their importance as cultural 
resources, both religious and aesthetic. (2) Forests are resources that contain resources, being 
made up of biosystems of varying complexity and used for many different social and 
economic functions as a part of complex social systems. (3) Forests resources are dynamic 
and defined on multiple scales. Forest and forest resource definitions differ in scale, but are 
not necessarily mutually exclusive.  
Southern forests illustrate this in the way that the wider public values them for wildlife, 
watershed, biodiversity, and climatic benefits (each requiring management at different 
scales). In contrast, trees and forests are used and valued by individual landowners for 
timber. Even when considering only a single resource, such as timber production or wildlife 
by individual owners, owners of individual parcels may want to encourage or guarantee 
that owners of adjacent parcels have compatible and complementary interests in their 
parcels. Neighbors want their neighbors to maintain wildlife habitat and keep vegetative 
cover intact. They also want adjacent land owners to allow wildlife transit and to refrain 
from introducing or encouraging certain problem species (McKean 2000).  
Gibson and Becker (2000), recognizing that forests generally constitute multiple resources, 
note that strong individual property rights alone do no guarantee a forest’s health since 
individuals can have short term incentives to convert or degrade forests that conflict with 
long term forest sustainability. Because they are common-pool and public resources, many 
forest resources cannot be effectively managed on the scale at which they are owned or in 
the decision-making time frames of some private owners. As a result, individual forest 
owners have an interest in what happens on lands adjacent to theirs. Southern pine beetle is 
a classic example of the stake neighbors have in the way their neighbors attend to forest 
health. 
One of the problems facing common-pool resources is the appropriation problem. If 
resource units have high value and institutional constraints do not restrict use, individuals 
face a strong temptation to overexploit and thereby degrade the resource. For example if a 
forest is open to access by all with no social institutions to limit use, is it likely that timber 
would be removed at such a rate that the forest would degrade and future timber harvests 
would be reduced (Hardin 1968). Extensive study of the appropriation problem by social 
scientists has found that the tragedy of the commons is not inevitable; resource users can 
organize to implement social mechanisms to restrict use to sustainable levels (Richard and 
Stein 2003). Other problems of common-pool resources, such as provision and maintenance 
problems, have received less study but are still important (Ostrom 1999). 
Forest health is essentially a provision and maintenance problem. In many ways, it is a 
public good, in that people can free ride on other people’s efforts to enhance forest health at 
a landscape or regional level. But McKean (2003) notes that public goods that are subject to 
crowding, wear, and depletion are not pure public goods, and have many characteristics of 
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common-pool resources. Furthermore, Ostrom (1999) notes that in the case of negative 
public goods (e.g. forest pests), individual owners or appropriators tend not to be motivated 
to pay for or take the collective actions that are required to reduce the negative public good, 
resulting in a negative provision of that good (e.g. poor forest health). Provision problems in 
common-pool resources are very similar to pure public good problems (Ostrom et al. 1994).  
Having shown that forests and forest health have important attributes of common-pool 
resources, the next question is what common-pool resource theory and scholarship can 
contribute to the health and management of Southern pine forests. Ostrom and Walker 
(1997) examined many cases of successful common-pool resource management. They 
identified design principles for development of institutions that increase the efficiency of 
management of common-pool resources, institutions that are often developed in 
combination by the resource users and the state. 
3. Key understandings from research on individual NIPF owners 
A legacy of medieval times, Carlsson (1996) explains why Swedish common forests have 
survived as vital and competitive actors in the timber market. These lands are held in 
common under shareholder arrangements managed by the government. He offers three 
main explanations: the commoners’ conscious attempts to reduce transaction costs, their 
general inventiveness in adjusting to changed circumstances, and their acclimatization to 
present economic conditions. Although he does not specifically address forest health issues, 
the notion that a commons institutions offers multiple advantages to a dispersed, 
nonresidential, and nontechnical population of forest owners suggests a need for new 
institutions and mechanisms to bind and benefit nonindustrial private forest land owners 
(NIPF).  
Most NIPF landowners are aware of SPB, many are interested in preventing the pest, and 
some express a desire to accomplish control measures (Molnar et al. 2003). Those actually 
taking action to prevent and manage infestations are few, however.  
Molnar et al. (2003) found important differences by size of forest landholding. Larger 
landholders are more likely to have taken steps to control infestations, but there were 
markedly lower levels of awareness, surveillance, and prevention activities among small 
holders. Larger landowners had high surveillance efforts and took more action to respond to 
SPB damage when it happened on their land. Larger landowners were also strongly 
influenced by timber prices in their efforts to control SPB. 
Smallholders lacked knowledge about what to do about SPB, lacking familiarity with public 
agency programs and utilization of financial assistance. They used fewer information 
sources, and expressed less desire for information about forest management (Molnar et al. 
2003). 
Some values that landowners–large and small–have for their forest land may provide less 
than compelling motivations for SPB management. Those interested in recreation and 
outdoor enjoyment and indicating preservation as a primary reason for forest ownership 
were less aware and interested in SPB management (Molnar et al. 2003). The control of SPB 
and the protection of forest health, involves more than the vigilance of the individual forest 
owner, however. 
Carlsson (1996: 12) concludes that the Swedish forest commons have survived as prosperous 
timber producers and providers of public goods, not only because of their conscious 
reduction of transaction costs but also because this reduction has been made possible by a 
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general fragmentation of the centralized State, playing its multiple roles. This fragmentation 
has provided a local ‘opportunity structure’ that the commons have utilized. This has been 
possible because the commons, their forest managers, boards and assemblies of 
shareholders still possess sufficient local, current knowledge to be able to adjust the 
commons to industrialized society. The main lesson to be learned from the Swedish 
common forests might be their successful integration, rather than their separation, from the 
logic of the negotiated economy and industrialized society. Designers of institutional 
mechanisms to articulate and organize the collective aspects of forest health might learn 
much from the Swedish experience. 
4. Calculating the benefit from change in rules of forest management 
Ostrom (1999:4) emphasizes that the “social behavior of adopting new practices in natural 
resources management as a rational decision process. Each user has to compare the net 
benefits continuing to use the old rules of harvesting from a resource to the benefits he or 
she expects to achieve with a new set of rules. Each user must ask whether his or her 
incentive to change is positive or negative. 
If the incentive to change is positive for some users, they then need to estimate three types of 
costs: the up-front cost of time and effort devising and agreeing upon new rules; the short-
term costs of adopting new strategies, and the long-term cost of monitoring and maintaining 
a self governed system over time (given the norms of community where they live). If the 
sum of these expected costs for each user exceeds the incentive to change, no user will invest 
the time and resources needed to create new institutions. And if this applies to all the users, 
no change will occur (Ostrom 1999:4). 
In field settings, not everyone expects the same cost and benefits from a proposed change. 
Consequently, the collective choice rules used to change the day-to-day operational rules 
related to management activities affect whether an institutional change favored by some and 
opposed by others will occur (Ostrom 1999:4). 
These comparisons can be difficult to make in practice since considerable uncertainty always 
exists concerning the strategies that participants will follow once rules are changed (Ostrom 
1999:4). But even though this is a difficult task, it is one undertaken frequently by users after 
discussing the effects of a change in rules. Rules about monitoring forest lands for SPB 
infestation may be one example of an institutional change. 
Prevention efforts require vigilant surveillance for infestations and adherence to planting 
and management recommendations that discourage SPB outbreaks. Once outbreaks occur, 
control requires prompt treatment, and a comprehensive response by all forest owners to 
stop the spread of SPB to neighboring lands (Egan and Jones 1993, Ervin et al. 2001). Yet 
many NIPF owners have weak and uneven ties to their properties, and many do not share 
the sense of urgency that professional foresters often have about SPB prevention and control 
(Williston et al. 1998).  
5. Forest health as a common property resource 
Land (and forest) tenure is now widely understood as bundle of rights, all or some of which 
may be privately owned. Under communal systems, no individual resource rights are 
privately owned. Under private property systems, the deed holder seemingly owns all 
rights.  
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It is increasingly clear that some rights in the bundle can never be exclusively held by 
individuals, and are in fact dependent on communal cooperation and respect. Forest health 
may be one such communally owned and managed resource that is held by all forest owners 
but no one singly. This common pool, open access resource, abused by one, can cause all to 
suffer. An ephemeral and situational commodity, forest health is often taken for granted 
when insects, fire, or other threats are not imminent. 
The owners of the forest health right or resource are connected in concentric levels of 
proximity. That is, near neighbors are more frequently and intensively affected by mutual 
actions and responsibilities. Distant parties are less frequently benefited or harmed by an 
individual landowner’s vigilance and response to forest health problems. Institutions such 
as forest fire districts sometimes connect land owners in defense of fire threats, but fire 
threats are not commonly limited to pest prevention. 
These indirect and fleeting communal connections among NIPF owners are at the core of the 
problems facing public agencies charged with promoting forest health. For the most part, 
locally resident forest land owners often have little basis for interpersonal association. Even 
among landowners who reside in the same county as their forest land, the increasing 
separation of residence from ownership diminishes the prospect for face-to-face interaction 
with neighboring forest land owners.  
McKean and Ostrom (1995) find it noteworthy that the definition of private property rights 
has to do with the rights, not the nature of the entity that holds them. The privateness of 
private property rights does not require that individual persons hold them; they may also be 
vested in groups of individuals. Unfortunately, the rights to forest health are not alienable or 
separable; such rights are evanescent or intangible. Yet when unevenly exercised, forest fires 
or large-scale timber losses from insect damage are the result. 
Scholars who have designed taxonomies to point out the difference between open access 
arrangements and common property have sometimes distinguished four very general 
"types" of property: public, private, common, and open access. McKean and Ostrom (1995) 
object to this classification because it creates the erroneous impression that common 
property is not private property and thus does not share in the desirable attributes of private 
property, although forest health property rights are indeed commonly held. They feel that 
common property is in fact shared private property and should be considered alongside 
business partnerships, joint-stock corporations and cooperatives. Yet, the shared resource of 
forest health is often not widely recognized as a common property resource 
Oakerson (1986) has suggested a model to analyze and explain the main factors involved in 
the management of common property resources. In its simplest form, the Oakerson model is 
based on understanding the relationships between the physical characteristics of the 
resource, the decision making rules of the group or users involved, the patterns of 
interactions resulting from the appropriation and use of the resource, and the outcomes of 
this process. Blaikie and Brookfield (1987) have modified the Oakerson model to explain the 
dynamic interactions and adaptive changes when a resource is managed under a communal 
(or collective) regime. 
Mutual regulation through the institutional equivalent of a common property regime is 
more desirable as resource use intensifies and approaches the productive limits of a resource 
system (McKean and Ostrom 1995). Further, since it is people who use resources, forest 
health common property becomes more desirable - not necessarily more workable but more 
valuable and thus more worth trying - as population density increases on a given resource 
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base. Thus the challenge to resource agencies endeavoring to create a common property 
resource in forest health must find a way to communicate with NIPF owners in such a way 
so they become aware of the common property resource they share and have a sense of 
ownership in the commons. 
Natural resources stakeholders have different interests, and investigation of these through 
discussion can help to identify how people view their current and potential roles in forest 
management (Higman et al.1999: 170). The challenge to resource managers is to 
communicate the common property resource aspects of forest health. Higman et al. 
(1999:170) claim that finding out how people see their own roles in forest management is an 
essential step toward agreeing about the objectives of forest management. One way of doing 
this is to focus discussion on stakeholders’ rights, responsibilities and results with respect to 
surveillance and timely response to SPB outbreaks. 
As a result from their different rights, responsibilities and returns, stakeholders also have 
different sorts of relationships with each other. Some may not be aware of each other, or 
may ignore each other; others may be in varying states of disagreement or cooperation in 
different issues related to forest management. Yet all share some level of common interest in 
forest health. 
6. Characterizing a robust common property system for forest health 
A robust system of social organization for NIPF owners that would promote and protect the 
common property aspects of forest health has yet to be devised. McKean (1992, 1996, 2000) 
has written on the nature of common property systems that would lead to ecological 
benefits for the natural world. She identifies a number of design criteria that may make 
common property systems robust (McKean 2000a), focusing on internal and external 
features of the resource management system.  
Internal Features pertain to relationships among co-owners, that is, among NIPF owners. 
Each of McKean’s design features is discussed in terms of a common property management 
system for forest health. 
1. Co-owners of resource rights must be a self-conscious and self-governing group. 
This feature is hard to envision occurring beyond a watershed or county scale. As 
previously discussed, nonresident, nontechnical, and dispersed landowners have no 
mechanism for communication or collaboration. Thus efforts to promote the common pool 
resource aspects of forest health must develop new mechanisms for linking heretofore-
unconnected NIPF owners. 
2. The group needs a mechanism for resolving internal conflict. 
Current mechanisms generate little direct conflict because NIPF owners have little occasion 
to interact with one another. Animosity toward noncompliant landowners may be 
manifested under specific circumstances, but the forest health consequences of NIPF owner 
indifference or neglect are typically absorbed or ignored by neighboring landowners. 
3. The rules need to provide for monitoring of behavior and enforcement of sanctions. 
Some states have laws and regulations that sanction noncompliant NIPF for neglecting SPB 
infestations, yet it is not clear how often these measures are put into play nor how effective 
they are in influencing behavior. 
4. The rules need to include arrangements to prevent abuse by guards. 
It is not clear who the “guards” might be for forest health. At present, public forest 
managers monitor aerial photos and accumulate reports of infestations to provide 
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assessments of SPB problems. Under a common property regime, NIPF owners themselves 
might play a greater role in surveillance, requiring access to private lands and other 
measures that might otherwise compromise individual property rights. If such access were 
used for private gain – e.g., off-roading, hunting, fishing, or trapping -- cooperation and the 
common property institution would be undermined. 
5. The rules need to be easily enforceable and ecologically conservative. 
Rules for managing forest health as common property would require a great deal of 
public education and would have to be nested in the current web of property law and 
public agency regulation. Monitoring and infestation response requirements would have 
to achieve a level of technical and sociopolitical consensus about the techniques of  
SPB control.  Motivating NIPF owners to participate in such discussions would a 
challenge to resource management agencies not only in terms of the sheer number of 
actors that would have to be contacted, but also in terms of the communication and 
participation efforts that would be needed to enlist and sustain NIPF owner involvement 
and commitment. 
6. The allocation of benefits from the commons needs to be roughly proportional to the 
effort (time, money) invested in the commons. 
Under the Swedish system discussed earlier, common members are shareholders in 
corporate institutions that protect and manage production from forest lands (Carlsson 1996). 
A U.S. system that endeavored to enlist NIPF in monitoring and managing forest health on a 
per acre basis might not produce sufficient incentives for small holders. Devising 
institutional incentives that motivate participation and commitment from large and small 
holders would have to balance the costs of participation with the infrequently tangible, 
usually delayed, and often diffuse benefits of forest health.  
External Features encompass relationships between the body of co-owners and the outside 
world. Four considerations relate to the issue of forest health. 
7. The co-owning community of resource users is much better off if it has independent 
jurisdiction or autonomy 
Soil and water conservation districts are examples of communities of resource users that 
have some independent jurisdiction. Such entities are, however, creatures of state and 
federal laws that enable them. It is clear that not all landowners participate, nor do all that 
participate benefit equally from these programs – particularly in terms of size of holding 
and ethnicity of the land owner (Schelhas 2003).  
8. The boundaries of common property regimes need to be set at an appropriate 
ecological scale and need to match ecosystem boundaries. 
It is not clear what the appropriate ecological scale is for forest health. Other efforts are 
underway to organize land owners on the scale of the watershed, thus is seem prudent to 
seek coincident boundaries between soil, water, and forest resource units of social 
organization. McKean (2000:10) points out that it is silly to introduce common property 
institutions where parceled individual property would make more sense, and it is vital to 
use common property where parcelization to individuals is not a good idea. Forest health is 
not a resource that is easily parcellized. 
9. It is important to select the right group to vest common property rights in order to get 
capacity to affect the problem. 
The unit of organization must be close enough to the problem to aggregate individual 
decisions and realize consequences for the resource to be managed. A common property 
institution should combine NIPF forest landowners in a way that connects their efforts to 
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the cause of forest health and achieves demonstrable consequences for the resource as well 
as the NIPF owners.   
10. On large resource systems, it is important to nest new layers of governance 
(federalism) 
Social organization designed to coalesce NIPF owners to achieve forest health must be 
aligned with the other emerging forms of association that endeavor to promote and protect 
resources. Forest resource management must complement water and soil management 
efforts; there must be some level of mutual reinforcement and synergy to achieve effective 
environmental management. The environment is interconnected; so must the efforts to make 
it sustainable. 
7. Social capital, social organization, and common property 
Each U.S. county has some level of social capital – fire districts, irrigation districts, soil 
conservation districts, forest associations, extension councils, etc.--that can be drawn on to 
construct the common property institution in forest health. Institutional changes that 
expand fire protection vigilance to forest health surveillance including SPB monitoring can 
build on existing social arrangements to protect forest health. Flora (2000: 87) notes the 
importance of building human and social capital for communities that are engage in natural 
resources management. Social capital involves mutual trust where people know they can 
count on someone, which fosters reciprocity. Mutual trust is established when different 
institutions and individuals can both give and receive. Mutual trust and reciprocity tend to 
occur when people work together.  
Flora (2000: 87) mentions that one way of building trust is to start with small projects that 
have immediate visible results that everyone can measure and contribute to. Face-to-face 
groups are the building blocks of social capital. The measurement of increased social capital 
is done by looking at the strengthened relationships and communication among unlikely 
segments within or outside the community and the increased availability of information and 
knowledge. McDonald and McLain (2003) describe the successful integration of community 
well-being and forest health in the Pacific Northwest. They found that a central vehicle for 
change was the creation of a quasi-public organization (Conservation and Development 
Council) that had as its first objective to improve economic and social well-being. 
Specifically, the Council promoted forest health and community well-being through habitat 
restoration programs that employed people in the area. The Council used special forest 
products programs to encourage businesses to pool resources for equipment and marketing, 
and give employees training in forest products harvest and marketing. The Council also 
sponsored a wood products production and marketing activities programs to help public 
and private owners produce and market wood products. 
Council activities also played an important role in creating new alliances and changing 
relationships among local and non-local organizations. It increased the capacity of local 
groups to obtain funds and gain access to technical expertise from outside organizations. In 
short, it provided an institutional substrate for managing the forest health commons. 
Ostrom (1999:2) defined a self-governed forest resource as one where actors, who are major 
users of the forest, are involved over time in making and adapting rules within collective-
choice arenas regarding the inclusion or exclusion of participants, appropriation strategies, 
obligation of participants, monitoring or sanctioning, and conflict resolution. In most 
modern political economies it is rare to find any resource system that are governed entirely 
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by participants without rules made by local, regional and national authorities also affecting 
key decisions. Thus in a self-governed system, participants make many, but not all, rules 
that affect the sustainability of the resource system and its use. 
Both the natural physical boundaries of a forest as well as the legal boundaries for a 
particular community's forest must be clearly identified and defined (McKean and Ostrom 
1995). The lack of definition and assignment of forest health property rights quite clearly 
represents a barrier to forestry management, on the one hand limiting the realization of 
prevention and control benefits and, on the other, encouraging "free rider" behavior and 
giving rise to the so-called tragedy of the commons—outbreaks that spread to neighboring 
properties and create otherwise avoidable catastrophic timber losses. 
Inflexible rules are brittle, and thus fragile, and can jeopardize an otherwise well-organized 
common property regime (McKean and Ostrom 1995). In particular, the science behind SPB 
had not fully defined the rise and fall of SPB populations. Consequently, in some years 
natural forces driving surges in SPB infestation may overcome high levels of surveillance 
and response to outbreaks. The setbacks and frustrations occurring to NIPF owners stress 
the institutions that normally prevent and control SPB outbreaks. 
Institutions for managing very large systems need to be layered, with considerable authority 
devolved to small components. Many different communities, some of which are in frequent 
contact with each other and some of which are not, may use a large forest. The need to 
manage a large forest as a unit would seem to contradict the need to give each of that 
forest's user communities some degree of independence. Nesting different user groups in a 
pyramidal organization appears to be one way to resolve this contradiction, allowing 
simultaneously for independence and coordination (Cernea 1985). The most successful 
models of nesting come from irrigation systems serving thousands of people at a time 
(McKean and Ostrom 1995). It is not clear whether such high levels of social organization 
are necessary or feasible to achieve forest health. 
8. Conclusions 
If forest health is an emerging commons, every new enclosure of the commons involves the 
infringement of somebody's personal liberty (Hardin 1968). Infringements made in the 
distant past are accepted because no contemporary complains of a loss. Newly proposed 
infringements to articulate monitoring and management responsibilities may be vigorously 
opposed by NIPF owners as violating property rights. But what do property rights mean? 
When landowners mutually agree to prevent and limit losses from natural threats, all forest 
owners become more free and perhaps more wealthy. As Hardin (1968) concludes by citing 
Hegel, "Freedom is the recognition of necessity"; individuals locked into the logic of the 
commons are free only to bring on universal ruin. Once they see the necessity of mutual 
coercion, they become free to pursue other goals.  
Like individual parcellation, the recognition of common property gives resource owners the 
incentive to prevent and control insect damage, to make investments in forest health and to 
manage them sustainably and thus efficiently over the long term (McKean and Ostrom 
1995). Forest health cannot be privately owned; it is an open-access resource. However, 
unlike individual parcellation, common property offers a way to continue productive use of 
the private aspects of a resource system while solving the monitoring and enforcement 
problems posed by the need to survey forest lands for insect problems.  
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